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Clarifying the Preemptive Scope of CERCLA Section 9658 




Due to rising public concern regarding the dumping of hazardous 
wastes, Congress enacted the Comprehensive Environmental Response, 
Compensation, and Liability Act (“CERCLA”), which was designed to 
remedy unlawful disposal and transportation of hazardous wastes as well as 
inadequate maintenance of disposal sites.
2
  Because some state statutes of 
limitation severely restricted parties from bringing CERCLA claims as they 
commenced “at the time of the injury instead of when the party ‘discovered’ 
that a hazardous substance caused the injury,” Congress enacted the 
Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization Act of 1986 (SARA).
3
  SARA 
established a discovery rule outlined in Section 9658,
4
 which was a federally 
required commencement date that “preempts state statutes of limitation if the 
claims are based on hazardous substance releases and the state limitations 
period provides a commencement date earlier than federal law.”5  
When Congress passed Section 9658 of CERCLA on October 17, 
1986,
6
 the plaintiff’s bar prematurely lauded the section as a device that 
would eliminate procedural barriers that prevented certain causes of action 
from being brought due to restrictive state-imposed statutes of limitation and 
                                                 
1
 Waldburger v. CTS Corp., 723 F.3d 434 (4th Cir. 2013). 
2
 Karen S. Nabholz, The Tick of the Statute of Limitations Clock: How the FRCD 
Preempts the State Law Accrual Date in Freier v. Westinghouse Electric Corporation, 15 
VILL. ENVTL.L.J. 41 (2004). 
3
 Id. at 42. 
4
 See infra note 53 (clarifying Section 9658 as also being the codified section and 
Section 309 as being the actual section of CERCLA). 
5
 Nabholz, supra note 2 (citing Angeles Chem. Co. v. Spencer & Jones, 51 Cal. Rptr. 2d 
594, 599 (Cal. Ct. App. 1996)(explaining circumstances where FRCD preempts state statutes 
of limitation)(quoting Tower Ashphalt, Inc. v. Determan Welding & Tank Serv., 530 N.W.2d 
872, 875 (Minn. Ct. App. 1995))). 
6
 P.L. No. 99-499, § 203(a), 100 Stat. 1695-96 (Oct. 17, 1986) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 
9658). 




  However, since Section 9658’s inception, there have 
been varying interpretations of the implications of the preemptive language 
found in the section,
8
 stirring much debate among federal courts.
9
  Center in 
this debate is whether Congress intended for CERCLA to preempt not only 
statutes of limitation, which focus on when the injury occurred or was 
discovered by the plaintiff, but also statutes of repose, which focus on when 
the defendant’s tortious act occurred.10 History suggests Congress used the 
terms “statute of limitations” and “statute of repose” interchangeably.11 
The following comment explores Waldburger v. CTS Corp.,
12
 in 
which the Fourth Circuit was faced with the question of whether Section 
9658 preempted a North Carolina statute of repose, despite the language of 
Section 9658 referring only to “statutes of limitations.”  The main issue to be 
analyzed is whether the Fourth Circuit’s application of the preemptive 
language of Section 9658 as applied to state statutes of repose adequately 
reflects Congress’s intent in passing the section.  By correctly holding in 
Waldburger that Congress’s intent was to preempt both statutes of limitation 
and statutes of repose, the Fourth Circuit has further clarified how federal 
courts should apply the preemptive language of Section 9658 to statutes of 
repose. 
II. FACTS & HOLDINGS 
Appellants David Bradley, Renee Richardson and twenty-three other 
landowners (“the landowners”) brought a nuisance action against Appellee 
CTS Corporation (“CTS”), after discovering in 2009 their well water 
contained concentrated levels of trichloroethylene (TCE) and cis-1, 2-
dichlorothene (DCE)—both known carcinogens.13  
                                                 
7
 Van R. Delhotal, Re-Examining CERCLA Section 309: Federal Preemption of State 




 See infra note 144. 
10
 See infra notes 93 and 94. 
11
 See infra note 84. 
12
 723 F.3d 434. 
13
 Waldburger v. CTS Corp., 723 F.3d 434, 437 (4th Cir. 2013). 
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From 1959 to 1985, CTS manufactured and disposed of electronics 
and electronic parts at the Mills Gap Road Electroplating Facility (“Facility”) 
on a fifty-four-acre plant located in Asheville, North Carolina.
14
  In its 
operation at the Facility, CTS stored significant amounts of TCE.
15
  
Additionally, manufacturing of the electronic products required the usage of 
TCE, cyanide, chromium VI, and lead.
16
  Upon selling the Facility in 1987, 
CTS promised realtors the site was environmentally sound and no wanton 
disposal practices occurred at the Facility.
17
  Further, CTS assured realtors 
that once any existing storage drums of hazardous materials were removed 




Over the years, the landowners bought portions of the land where the 
Facility was formerly located.
19
  However, subsequent to the purchase, the 
landowners were notified by the Environmental Protection Agency (“EPA”) 
that their property was contaminated.
20
  Jointly, residents who lived within 
the area of the former Facility brought a state law nuisance claim and 
contended they were continuously being exposed to toxins from the air, land 
and water resulting from CTS’s operations.21  Due to their allegations of 
unknowingly being exposed to toxins, the landowners cited damages such as 
diminution in the value of their land and fear for their health and safety.
22
  
Further, the landowners requested a judgment forcing CTS to reclaim 
1,000,000 pounds of toxic contaminants belonging to the corporation; 
remediation of the harm caused by CTS; and monetary compensation for 
losses and damages suffered, both present and future.
23
  
                                                 
14
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In response to the complaint, CTS filed a motion to dismiss, citing a 
North Carolina statute
24
 that sets a ten-year limitations period for a real 
property action that accrues over time.
25
  The statute establishes that 
claimants cannot bring an action for property damage more than ten years 
after the defendant’s tortious act.26  Importantly, the statute makes knowledge 
of the harm within the ten-year window irrelevant.
27
  Accordingly, CTS 
argued that because their alleged last act or omission occurred in 1987 and 
the landowners were bringing the nuisance action in 2011, the claim should 
be barred based on North Carolina’s law.28  
In return, the landowners relied on the language of CERCLA to prove 
that their claim should not be barred.
29
  Specifically, the landowners argued 
CERCLA’s Section 9658 discovery rule, under which claims accrue on the 
date plaintiffs knew or should have known of injuries as a result of hazardous 
substances, preempted North Carolina law.
30
  However, the magistrate judge 
rejected the landowners’ argument and differentiated the North Carolina law 
as a statute of repose, whereas Section 9658 of CERCLA only preempts state 
statutes of limitation.
31
  Based on the magistrate judge’s recommendation of 
dismissal, the district court granted CTS’s motion to dismiss.32  
On appeal, the Fourth Circuit reversed the district court’s decision.  
The Fourth Circuit rejected the characterization of North Carolina’s law as a 
                                                 
24
 “Within three years an action…[u]nless otherwise provided by statute, for personal 
injury or physical damage to claimant’s property, the cause of action, except in causes of 
actions referred to in G.S. 1-15(c), shall not accrue until bodily harm to the claimant or 
physical damage to his property becomes apparent or ought reasonably to have become 
apparent to the claimant, whichever event first occurs.  Provided that no cause of action shall 
accrue more than 10 years form the last act or omission of the defendant giving rise to the 
cause of action.” N.C. GEN.STAT. § 1-52(16).N.C. Gen.Stat. § 1-52(16). 
25
 Waldburger, 723 F.3d at 441. 
26
 Id. at 440-41. 
27
 Id. at 441. 
28
 Id.Waldburger, 723 F.3d at 441. 
29
 Id. at 438. 
30
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statute of repose and instead likened it to a statute of limitation.
33
  Because 
the court found no distinction between the North Carolina law and Section 
9658, the court held that CERCLA preempted North Carolina’s ten-year 
limitation on the accrual of real property claims.
34
  Accordingly, statutes of 
limitations and statutes of repose conflicting with Section 9658 of CERCLA 
will be preempted. 
III. LEGAL BACKGROUND 
A. History of CERCLA 
In response to the Valley of the Drums
35
 and Love Canal
36
 disasters in 
the 1960s and 1970s, Congress was faced with the task of developing 
legislation that would establish a means of redress and compensation for the 
dumping of toxic wastes.  Thus, in 1980, Congress passed CERCLA to 
address the emerging problem of unregulated hazardous substance release.
37
  
CERCLA identifies both a public and private mechanism for determining 
liability with regards to clean up and compensation.
38
  CERCLA allows for 
                                                 
33
 Id. at 442-443. 
34
 Id. at 445.Waldburger, 723 F.3d at 445. 
35
 “The Valley of the Drums is a twenty-three acre site near Louisville, Kentucky, where 
a large number of waste-storing drums were deposited in the 1960s.  The drums’ leakage and 
the lack of regulation at the site caused an environmental disaster.” Id. at 438 n.1 (citing NPL 
Site Narrative for A.L. Taylor (Valley of the Drums), ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY (Sept. 8, 1983), 
http://www.epa.gov/superfund/sites/npl/nar447.htm).Waldburger v. CTS Corp., 723 F.3d 
434, 438 (4th Cir. 2013) (citing NPL Site Narrative for A.L. Taylor (Valley of the Drums), 
Envtl. Prot. Agency (Sept. 8, 1983), http:// www.epa.gov/superfund/sites/npl/nar447.htm). 
36
 Love Canal, near Niagara Falls, New York, became a dumpsite in the 1920s for toxic 
chemicals and the consequences of the contamination did not come to light until the 1970s. . 
Id. at 438 n.2 (citing Eckardt C. Beck, The Love Canal Tragedy, ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY 
(Jan. 1979), http://www2.epa.gov/aboutepa/love-canal-tragedy).Waldburger v. CTS Corp., 
723 F.3d 434, 438 (4th Cir. 2013)(citing Eckardt C. Beck, The Love Canal Tragedy, Envtl. 
Prot. Agency (Jan.1979), http://www.epa.gov/history/topics/lovecanal/01.html. 
37
 Lewis M. Barr, CERCLA Made Simple: An Analysis of the Cases Under the 
Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act of 1980, 45 BUS. 
LAW. 923, 925 (1990). Lewis M. Barr, CERCLA Made Simple: An Analysis of the Cases 
Under the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act of 
1980, 45 Bus. Law. 923, 925 (1990). 
38
 Id. 
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the federal government to immediately be given the “tools necessary for a 
prompt and effective response to problems” derived from the dumping of 
toxic materials
39
 and impose cleanup costs on those responsible for the 
unlawful dumping.
40
   
Additionally, CERCLA was designed to “establish a comprehensive 
response and financing mechanism to abate and control the vast problems 
associated with abandoned and inactive hazardous waste disposal sites” and 
“shift the costs of cleanup to the parties responsible for the contamination.”41 
Notably, because Congress passed CERCLA during the closing hours of the 
ninety-sixth session and did so only due to a compromise that blended three 
separate bills, the Act has been notorious for its lack of clarity.
42
  However, it 
is clear that CERCLA is a remedial statute designed to right the wrongs 
caused by the illegal dumping of toxic wastes.
43
  
Because of the haphazard manner in which CERCLA was passed, 
Congress created a Study Group (“Group”) to “determine the adequacy of 
common law and statutory remedies in providing legal redress for harm to 
man and the environment caused by the release of hazardous substances in 
the environment.”44  By creating the Group, Congress decided against 
creating a “federal cause of action for persons injured by the release of 
                                                 
39
 United States v. Reilly Tar & Chem. Corp., 546 F.Supp. 1100, 1112 (D. 
Minn.1982).United States v. Reilly Tar & Chem. Corp., 546 F.Supp. 1100, 1112 (D. 
Minn.1982). 
40
 Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co., 491 U.S. 1, 7 (1989).Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co., 
109 S.Ct. 2273, 2277 (1989). 
41
 Metro. Water Reclamation Dist. v. N. Am. Galvanizing & Coatings Inc., 473 F.3d 
824, 826-27 (7th Cir. 2007) (quoting H.R.Rep. No. 96-1016, pt. 1, at 22 (1980), reprinted in 
1980 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6119, 6120).Metropolitan Water Reclamation Dist. v. N. Am. 
Galvanizing & Coatings Inc., 473 F.3d 824, 826-27 (7th Cir. 2007)(quoting H.R.Rep. No. 
96-1016, pt. 1, at 22 (1980), reprinted in 1980 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6119, 6120). 
42
 “CERCLA is not a paradigm of clarity or precision. It has been criticized frequently 
for inartful drafting and numerous ambiguities attributable to its precipitous passage.” 
Waldburger v. CTS Corp., 723 F.3d 434, 438 (quoting Artesian Water Co. v. New Castle 
Cnty., 851 F.2d 643, 658 (3rd Cir. 1988)).  
43
 Id. (citing Metro. Water Reclamation Dist., 473 F.3d at 826-27 (7th Cir. 2007) 
(internal citations omitted)). 
44
 42 U.S.C.. § 9651 (2012).  
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hazardous substances.”45 Instead, the twelve-member Group, comprised of 
law professors and attorneys from both the plaintiff and defense bars, 
considered the adequacy of current state common law remedies for 
compensating victims of hazardous wastes.
46
  The Group considered the 
sufficiency and availability of existing remedies under the then present state 
statutes in remedying harm from the unlawful dumping of hazardous 
substances; the nature of barriers to recovery with respect to initiating 
lawsuits; the scope of evidentiary burdens placed on the plaintiff, especially 
in consideration of the hurdle of scientific uncertainty in proving causation; 
the adequacy of existing remedies available for compensation for natural 
resources damage; the scope of liability—especially with respect to 
insurance—that limits initial liability; and barriers to recovery due to existing 
laws establishing statutes of limitation.
47
 
Among their findings, the Group noted that environmental injuries 
related to the dumping of hazardous substances generally have “long latency 
periods, sometimes [twenty] years or longer[,]” and state laws ordering 
causes of action to accrue upon the defendant’s last act or plaintiff’s exposure 
to harm will defeat a lawsuit before its initiation since manifestations of 
injury will often occur after the statute of limitations has fully run.
48
  Thus, as 
a result of the findings, the Group recommended “that all states . . . clearly 
adopt the rule that an action accrues when the plaintiff discovers or should 
have discovered the injury or disease and its cause.”49  The Group came to 
this conclusion in order to “remove unreasonable procedural and other 
barriers to recovery in court” for plaintiffs, including rules associated with 
the “time of accrual of actions.”50  Notably, the Group made a point to apply 
                                                 
45
 Delhotal, supra note 7, at 420. 
46
 Thomas O. McGarity, Proposal for Linking Culpability and Causation to Ensure 
Corporate Accountability for Toxic Risks, 26 WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. & POL'Y REV. 1, 51 
(2001) (citing 42 U.S.C. § 9651(e)). 
47
 42 U.S.C. § 9651(e)(1)-(4). 
48
 Superfund Section 301(e) Study Group, Injuries and Damages from Hazardous 
Wastes-Analysis and Improvement of Legal Remedies, A Report to Congress in Compliance 
with Section 301(e) of the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and 
Liability Act of 1980 (P.L. 96-510), 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 43 (Comm. Print 1982) available at 
http://babel.hathitrust.org/cgi/pt?id=mdp.39015004856327;view=1up;seq=45. 
49
 Id. at 241. 
50
 Id. at 240. 
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their findings to cover the repeal of state statutes of repose, such as the North 
Carolina law at issue in Waldburger v. CTS Corp.
51
  
B. Section 9658 of CERCLA 
In response to the Group’s findings, Congress opted out of waiting for 
the individual states to amend their statutes and instead chose to “address the 
problem identified in the study.”52  Thus, on October 17, 1986, Section 
9658
53
 was added to CERCLA.
54
  The key provision of Section 9658 states: 
“If the applicable limitations period55 for specified state law actions provides 
a commencement date which is earlier than the federally required 
commencement date, such period shall commence at the federally required 
commencement date in lieu of the date specified in such State statute.”56  
Specifically, the “federally required commencement date” is, “the date 
plaintiff knew (or reasonably should have known) that the personal injury or 
property damages … were caused or contributed to by the hazardous 
substance or pollutant or contaminant concerned.”57  Section 9658 is 
applicable to “[a]ny action brought under state law for personal injury, or 
property damages, which are caused or contributed to by exposure to any 
hazardous substance, or pollutant or contaminant, released into the 
environment from a facility....”58 
                                                 
51
 Id. at 241. 
52
 Waldburger v. CTS Corp., 723 F.3d 434, 439 (4th Cir. 2013) (quoting H.R. Rep. No. 
99-962, at 261 (1986) (Conf. Rep.), reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3276, 3354). 
53
 § 9658 refers to the statutory section number, but the reader should keep in mind that 
the section can also be referred to by its CERCLA section number (§ 309).  Technically, § 
309 was added to CERCLA and then codified as § 9658, but for the sake of consistency and 
our purposes, I will use § 9658 throughout this note. 
54
 Delhotal, supra note 7, at 417 (citing Pub. L. No. 99-499, § 203(a), 100 Stat. 1695096 
(1986) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 9658)). 
55
 “The term ‘applicable limitations period’ is defined to mean the period specified in a 
statute of limitations during which the specified civil actions may be brought . . . It includes 
both statutory and common law commencement dates.” Id. at 417 n.8 (citing 42 U.S.C. §§ 
9658(b)(2), (a)(1) (2012)). 
56
 42 U.S.C. § 9658(a)(1). 
57
 42 U.S.C. § 9658(b)(4)(A). 
58
 42 U.S.C. § 9658(a)(1). 
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Essentially, Section 9658 sets a federal minimum standard for accrual 
dates in certain type of cases, such as those involving personal injury and 
property damage claims.
59
  Such federal minimum standards are not novel—
federal law has established many minimum standards in environmental 
legislation, such as the Clean Air Act and Solid Waste Disposal Act.
60
  
However, Section 9658 has been the subject of criticism for seemingly 
violating the principles of federalism by encroaching on the sovereign 
authority of a state in determining statutes of limitation for certain causes of 
actions.
61
  Nonetheless, Section 9658 is significant in that if either a state 
statutory or common law provides for an earlier accrual date than that of 
Section 9658, the federal minimum date usurps the state law.
62
  Alternatively, 
Section 9658 allows for the application of state law if the accrual date would 
be the same under federal law.
63
     
C. Interpreting Ambiguous Statutes 
Courts are frequently faced with interpreting statutes whose meanings 
are not easily discernible.  When faced with interpreting such a statute, the 
court’s goal is to “effectuate Congress’s intent”64 by reading the text of the 
statute
65
 and considering whether the law is either plain in meaning or 
ambiguous.  If a plain reading of the text is appropriate, the court will accord 
it the straightforward meaning, “absent … clearly expressed legislative intent 
to the contrary.”66  However, if the text is determined to be ambiguous, the 
court will defer to the legislative history of the statute.
67
  A statute is deemed 
ambiguous if it is “susceptible to two or more reasonable interpretations,” but 
                                                 
59
 Delhotal, supra note 7, at 418. 
60
 Id. at 418 n.22 (internal citations omitted). 
61
 Id. (citing Alfred R. Light, Federal Preemption, Federal Conscription Under the New 
Superfund Act, 38 MERCER L. REV. 643, 651 (1987)). 
62
 42 U.S.C. 9658(a)(1). 
63
  Id. 
64
 Waldburger v. CTS Corp., 723 F.3d 434, 442 (4th Cir. 2013) (citing United States v. 
Abdelshafi, 592 F.3d 602, 607 (4th Cir. 2010)). 
65
 Id. (citing Holland v. Big River Minerals Corp., 181 F.3d 597, 603 (4th Cir. 1999)). 
66
 Waldburger, 723 F.3d at 442 (citing Abdelshafi, 592 F.3d at 607 (quoting United 
States v. Bell, 5 F.3d 64, 68 (4th Cir. 1993))). 
67
 Id. (quoting Stiltner v. Beretta U.S.A. Corp., 74 F.3d 1473, 1482 (4th Cir. 1996) (en 
banc)). 
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is not considered ambiguous if different interpretations are merely 
conceivable.
68
  Additionally, the court considers the specific context in which 
the language is used—specifically giving consideration to the broader context 
of the statute as a whole.
69
 
D. The Preemption Doctrine 
As a principle of statutory interpretation, the notion of “presumption 
against preemption” is relatively new when considering early discussions of 
state versus federal power.
70
  Deriving from the Supremacy Clause,
71
 the 
preemption doctrine is the “judicial tool by which courts define the contours 
of federal control of a subject when Congress has legislated pursuant to one 
of its enumerated powers.”72  Further, the doctrine “gives content to the 
parameters of that principle in areas left in doubt under particular federal 
legislation, and there inevitably will be areas of doubt.”73  Ultimately, the 
preemption doctrine attempts to define what law controls when there is a 
conflict, or the appearance of one, between federal and state law.
74
   
Historically, when Congress decided to enter an area of regulation, 
there was an assumption that Congress occupied the entire field being 
regulated.
75
  However, with the advent of the New Deal in the 1930s, the 
Supreme Court increasingly became uncomfortable with expansive federal 
                                                 
68
 Agrilink Foods, Inc. v. Dep’t of Revenue, 103 P.3d 1226, 1228-1229 (2005) (quoting 
State v. Hahn, 924 P.2d 392 (1996)). 
69
 Id. (citing Holland, 181 F.3d at 603 (quoting Robinson, 519 U.S. at 341 (internal 
citations omitted))). 
70
 Robert N. Weiner, The Height of Presumption: Preemption and the Role of Courts, 32 
HAMLINE L. REV. 727, 727 (2009). 
71
 See U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2. 
72
 Mary J. Davis, Unmasking the Presumption in Favor of Preemption, 53 S.C. L. REV. 






 Weiner, supra note 70, at 728 n.3 (citing Stephen A. Gardbaum, The Nature of 
Preemption, 79 CORNELL L. REV. 767, 786 (1994) (noting that “[u]nlike modern preemption 
doctrine, which is focused exclusively on the (express or implied) intent of Congress, the 
earlier doctrine operated automatically whenever Congress entered a field of regulation; thus 
any federal regulation of any given area automatically preempted all state regulation in the 
same area.”)). 




  In Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., an early field preemption 
case, the Supreme Court stated that it should be assumed that “the historic 
police powers of the States were not to be superseded by the Federal Act 
unless that was the clear and manifest purpose of Congress.”77  Paramount to 
the application of the preemption doctrine is the Justices’ “political or 
philosophical beliefs about the scope of federal legislation and how it should 
be interpreted.”78 
Currently, preemption analysis involves state law yielding to federal 
law, vis-a-vis the Supremacy Clause, “if the federal statute contains explicit 
language preempting the state law.”79  Alternatively, “a court may find a state 
law impliedly preempted if it directly conflicts with federal law—if 
compliance with both state and federal law is a physical impossibility—or if 
state law stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment offederal goals,” i.e., 
“obstacle preemption.”80  When determining whether the preemption doctrine 
applies, the Supreme Court has taken various routes.  In some cases, the 
Supreme Court has conspicuously ignored the presumption and in other cases 
has reinforced the notion that in cases areas traditionally regulated by state 
law,
81
 the presumption against preemption is given special force, while also 
considering Congress’s purpose of passing the piece of legislation.82   
                                                 
76
 Id. at 728. 
77
 Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947). 
78
 Davis, supra note 72, at 970.  See David B. Spence & Paula Murray, The Law, 
Economics, and Politics of Federal Preemption Jurisprudence: A Quantitative Analysis, 87 
CAL. L. REV. 1125, 1129 (1999) (“For most judges, whether liberal or conservative, these 
cases pit one dimension of their ideology, their principles of federalism, against another, 
their policy preferences or attitudes toward the particular local regulation at issue.”).  See 
also J. Harvie Wilkinson III, Federalism for the Future, 74 S. CAL. L. REV. 523, 536 (2001). 
79
 Nina A. Mendelson, A Presumption Against Agency Preemption, 102 NW. U. L. REV. 
695, 699-700 (2008) (citing U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2; Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470, 
484 (1996) (“[T]he pre-emptive language of [the relevant statute] means we need not go 
beyond that language to determine whether Congress intended the MDA to pre-empt at least 
some state law …, [though] we must nonetheless ‘identify the domain expressly pre-empted’ 
by that language ….” (citations omitted))). 
80
 Id. at 700. 
81
 “Traditional state powers” are those areas of governance pertaining to the “life, health, 
and safety of the general public.”  Davis, supra note 72, at 968. 
82
 Weiner, supra note 70, at 729. 
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E. Similar Cases to Waldburger v. CTS Corp. 
Prior to Waldburger, both the Fifth and Ninth Circuits addressed the 
issue of whether Section 9658 preempts state statutes of repose.  In 
McDonald v. Sun Oil Company, the Ninth Circuit was faced with a similar 
issue as that in Waldburger.  Plaintiff property owners in Jefferson County, 
Oregon, brought suit against Sun Oil Company (“Sun”) for alleged 
negligence, contribution, breach of contract and fraud due to the unlawful 
dumping of calcine
83
 tailings at Horse Heaven Mine.
84
  Granting Sun’s 
motion for summary judgment, the district court held that the plaintiffs’ 
negligence claim was barred by Oregon’s statute of repose for negligent 
injury to person or property.
85
  The Ninth Circuit reversed, holding that the 
phrase “statute of limitations” in Section 9658 was intended by Congress to 
include statutes of repose and it was ambiguous as to whether it excluded 
statutes of repose.
86
  Like the court in Waldburger, the Ninth Circuit 
acknowledged that many instances existed in which the terms “statute of 
limitations” and “statute of repose” were used interchangeably by Congress.87  
Thus, similar to the conclusion made in Waldburger, the court determined 
there was considerable uncertainty about the distinction between the two 
terms and so ambiguity existed as to whether Section 9658 applied solely to 
statutes of limitation or included statute of repose.
88
 
Because the term “statute of limitations” was ambiguous at the time 
Congress passed Section 9658, the court next reviewed the legislative history 
of CERCLA.  Similarly to the court in Waldburger, the McDonald court 
referenced the Group’s conclusions that Congress should “adopt a rule that 
an action accrues when the plaintiff discovers or should have discovered the 
                                                 
83
 McDonald v. Sun Oil Co., 548 F.3d 774, 778 (9th Cir. 2008) (“Calcine is a waste 
product resulting from the processing of mercury ore into mercury.  Mercury sulfide ore is 
mined, crushed, and heated in a furnace or ‘retort’ to separate mercury from the ore.  After 
the heating process is complete, the crushed rock, now called calcine, is stockpiled.”). 
84
 Id. at 777. 
85




 Id. (citing BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (8th ed. 2004)). 
88
 Id. 
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injury or disease and its cause.”89  Since the term “statute of repose” is not 
used in any of the text of the United States Code, and because Congress 
specifically cited to the Group’s recommendations, the Ninth Circuit 
concluded that the legislative history indicates that the term “statute of 
limitations” applied to “statutes of repose.”90 
Conversely, the Fifth Circuit came to a different conclusion in 
Burlington Northern & Santa Fe Railroad Company v. Poole Chemical 
Company, holding that CERCLA did not preempt a Texas statute of repose 
for products liability claims.
91
   The court contended that CERCLA was 
intended only to address issues of delayed discovery regarding long-latency 
diseases caused by the dumping of toxic chemicals.
92
  However, the products 
liability claim derived from the rupturing of a tank containing agricultural 
blending materials, which made the plaintiffs instantaneously aware of the 
resulting harm.
93
  Because the injury that occurred was not associated with 




IV. INSTANT DECISION 
Prior to analyzing the ruling of the district court, the Fourth Circuit in 
Waldburger v. CTS Corp. examined the concepts of “statutes of limitation” 
and “statutes of repose.”95  The court acknowledged that both concepts 
function as limitations the amount of time a plaintiff could potentially bring a 
claim.
96
  Thus, the court compared the Black’s Law Dictionary definition of 
the two terms.  A statute of limitation is a “law that bars claims after a 
specified period…based on the date when the claim accrued (as when the 
injury occurred or was discovered).”97  A statute of repose “bars any suit that 
                                                 
89
 Id. at 782. 
90
 Id. at 783. 
91
 Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. Poole Chem. Co., 419 F.3d 355, 358 (5th Cir. 
2005). 
92
 Id. at 364. 
93
 Id. at 365. 
94
 Id. at 364-65. 
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is brought after a specified time since the defendant’s act…even if this period 
ends before the plaintiff has suffered a resulting injury.”98  The court noted 
that because North Carolina barred lawsuits brought more than ten years after 
the defendant acted regardless of the plaintiff’s knowledge of his harm,99 the 
limitation should be characterized as a statute of repose, rather than a statute 
of limitation.
100
  Accordingly, the court concurred with the district court’s 
assessment that despite North Carolina not explicitly identifying the 
limitation as a statute of repose within the text of the law, it was proper to 
categorize the law as such.
101
   
After establishing that North Carolina’s ten-year limitation was a 
statute of repose, the court embarked on an exercise of statutory 
interpretation to determine whether Section 9658 of CERCLA would affect 
the operation of the limitation.
102
  The court had to determine Congress’s 
intent in passing Section 9658 by first examining the text of the statute to 
determine whether the language was plain in meaning or ambiguous.
103
  In 
the analysis of whether the text was plain, the court took into consideration 
the language itself, the specific context of the language, and the broader 
context of the statute in its entirety.
104
 
Upon considering these factors, the court determined that the statute 
was ambiguous.
105
  Although on its face, the text could lead to a reasonable 
conclusion that Section 9658 only applied to statutes of limitation since the 
term is used five different times,
106
 compared to the term “statutes of repose” 
                                                 
98
 Id. (citing BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1546 (9th ed. 2009)). 
99




 Id. at 441-42 (internal citations omitted). 
102




 Id. (citing United States v. Abdelshafi, 592 F.3d 602, 607 (4th Cir. 2010) (quoting 




 In his dissent, Circuit Judge Thacker cited the plain meaning of the language used in 
§ 9658.  He noted that the statute defines “the applicable limitations period” as the “period 
specified in a statute of limitations (emphasis in orginal) during which a civil action … of 
this section may be brought.”  Id. at 446 (Thacker, J., dissenting).  Thus, he concluded, § 
9658 only preempts “state law where a state statute of limitation begins to run before it 
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not being used at all, the court concluded that an alternate interpretation was 
also feasible.
107
  In support of a second reading, the court compared the 
language of Section 9658 to the North Carolina law.
108
  Under Section 9658, 
two conditions regarding a state limitations period must be met before the 
federally required commencement date applies to the cause of action: (1) it 
must be an “applicable limitation period . . . specified in the State statute of 
limitations or under common law,” and (2) it must “provide a commencement 
date which is earlier than the federally required commencement date.”109  
Applying these two conditions, the court outlined three reasons why 
the North Carolina ten-year limitations met the requirements of Section 9658, 
and was therefore preempted.
110
  First, the court reasoned that the ten-year 
bar was a limitations period “specified in the State statute of limitations or 
under common law.”111  Next, because the landowners had a ten-year 
window to bring a civil action under the North Carolina law, the court 
characterized the limitation as comporting with the definition of “applicable 
limitations period” defined in Section 9658.112  Lastly, because the running of 
the statute of limitations began when the defendant committed his last act, as 
opposed to when the plaintiff had knowledge of the harm, the North Carolina 
commencement date started earlier than its federal counterpart.
113
  Thus, 
despite Section 9658’s repeated usage of “statute of limitations” in the text, 
the law is susceptible to an interpretation that includes statutes of repose, like 
North Carolina’s.114  Because of the possibility of two reasonable 
interpretations, the court found the statutory language to be ambiguous.
115
 
                                                                                                                         
would have run under the federally required commencement date.”  Id. at 446-47 (Thacker, 
J., dissenting). 
107








 Id. (citing N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-52; quoting 42. U.S.C. § 9658(a)(1)). 
112
Id. “The term ‘applicable limitations period’ means the period specified in a statute of 
limitations during which a civil action referred to in subsection (a)(1) of this section may be 
brought.” 42 U.S.C. § 9658(b)(2). 
113




 Id. at 442-43. 
CLARIFYING THE PREEMPTIVE SCOPE OF CERCLA SECTION 9658 
242
In support of their ruling, the court outlined two explanations for their 
decision.
116
  First, the court reasoned that both courts and scholars have used 
the terms “statute of limitations” and “statute of repose” interchangeably.117  
Thus, the court found that Congress’s sole usage of “statutes of limitation” 
within the text was not dispositive as to whether Section 9658 should apply 
to statutes of repose and it was entirely reasonable that Congress intended 
“statute of limitations” to apply to ten-year limitations like the one found in 
North Carolina.
118
  Further, the court held that Section 9658 lacked internal 
consistency in reference to the “applicable limitations period” and 
“commencement date” because the section failed to manifest a plain meaning 
applicable to a statute of limitation found under the common law.  Instead, 
the section only discusses the applicability of the “applicable limitations 
period” and “commencement date” under state statute.119 
Because the court found the text of Section 9658 to be ambiguous, 
they examined the congressional intent in passing the section and the 
legislative history of CERCLA for interpretation purposes.
120
  The court 
noted that Section 9658 was adopted by Congress in response to the Group, 
created at the time of the passing of CERCLA, which had the goal of 
determining the “adequacy of existing common law and statutory remedies in 
providing legal redress for harm…caused by the release of hazardous 
substances into the environment.”121  Based on the Group’s findings and 
recommendation to require all states to adopt a rule in which an action 
accrues when the plaintiff discovers or should have reasonably discovered the 
                                                 
116
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 Id. at 438-39 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 9651(e)(1)). 
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harm and its cause,
122
 Congress preemptively passed Section 9658 to directly 
address the problems identified by the Group.
123
 
Additionally, the court pointed to the remedial and corrective—as 
opposed to regulatory—nature of CERCLA.124  Specifically, the court noted 
the characterization of CERCLA being a “backward-looking statute” 
designed to ensure adequate remedies for plaintiffs with claims regarding 
hazardous waste sites and toxic spills.
125
  Thus, the court reasoned that 
because of the remedial nature of CERCLA, the section was passed by 
Congress to comport with the goal of preempting state limitation periods that 




Because of the reinforced characterization of CERCLA as corrective 
in nature the court employed a “standard of liberal construction” applicable 
to remedial statutes.
127
  Applying such a standard, the court explicitly 
rejected an interpretation of Section 9658 that excluded application to 
provisions like North Carolina’s ten-year bar on accrual of real property 
claims.
128
  Although the court conceded than an alternate interpretation is 
perfectly reasonable, the court refused to apply such a narrow approach that 
“thwarts Congress’s unmistakable goal of removing barriers to relief from 
toxic wreckage.”129  The court further reasoned that such a limited approach 
                                                 
122
 “Worth noting is that the Group did not confine its concerns simply to statutes of 
limitation: ‘The Recommendation is intended also to cover the repeal of statutes of repose 
which, in a number of states have the same effect as some statutes of limitation in barring [a] 
plaintiff’s claim before he knows that he has one.’”  Id. at 439 (citing 301(e) Study Group, 
supra note 48, at 241). 
123
 Id. (quoting H.R. Rep. No. 99-962, at 261 (1986) (Conf. Rep.), reprinted in 1986 
U.S.C.C.A.N. 3276, 3354). 
124
 Id. at 443 (citing Blake A. Watson, Liberal Construction of CERCLA Under the 
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ENVTL. L. REV. 199, 286 (1996)). 
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in interpreting the application of Section 9658 to statutes of repose would 
effectively “allow states to obliterate legitimate causes of action before they 
exist.”130  Thus, the court held that Section 9658 preempts North Carolina’s 
ten-year limitation on the accrual of real property claims.
131
 
In so holding, the court acknowledged that many underlying policy 
reasons justify statutes of repose.
132
  However, in support of their holding, the 
court noted that the goal of statutes of repose is not solely to protect 
defendants, but also to ensure the efficient processing of cases.
133
  
Accordingly, the court noted that protections still exist for potential 
defendants in that the burden of proof continues to rest on the plaintiff, and, 
as time passes, necessary evidence will disappear and intervening causes will 
complicate the burden of proving causation.
134
  Additionally, the court made 
the observation that in under North Carolina law, plaintiffs are still required 
to bring claims within three years of discovery, which is in accordance with 
CERCLA.  In conclusion, the court stated that by holding that North 
Carolina’s ten-year limitation on the accrual of actions is preempted by 
Section 9658 of CERCLA, the court simply furthered Congress’s intent to 
help remove recovery barriers that victims of toxic waste face in seeking to 




Notably in his dissent, Judge Thacker argued that a presumption 
against preemption should be applied when interpreting Section 9658.
136
  
Such a reading would limit the reach of Section 9658 to only state statutes of 
limitation, without extending it to state statutes of repose.
137
  The dissent 
asserted that, “Even federal laws containing a preemption clause, such as 













 Id. at 445. 
136
 Id. at 453 (Thacker, J., dissenting). 
137
 Id. at 445 (Thacker, J., dissenting). 
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9658, do not automatically escape the presumption against preemption.”138  
Further, the dissent reasoned that a state’s ability to create a substantive right, 
such as a state tort law limiting liability, has long been held to be within the 
realm of state regulation.
139
  Thus, when taking these considerations as 





With the advent of federal agencies promulgating complex and 
convoluted regulations, like those implementing CERCLA, the jurisprudence 
regarding whether these rules preempt similar state laws has become equally 
complex and convoluted.
141
  Past precedent.
142
  In some instances, courts 
have developed a “clear statement” rule regarding the presumption against 
preemption: the court will not interpret a statute as overriding a state law 
unless Congress has clearly and unambiguously stated its intent to 
preempt.
143
   Other courts have articulated the rule explicitly, holding that the 
presumption should be that Congress did not intend to supersede state law.
144
 
Conversely, some courts have ignored the rule of presumption against 
preemption completely.
145
   As a consequence of these “helter-skelter” 
applications, some courts have been accused of using the preemption doctrine 
as a shield to issue result-oriented decisions.
146
  Thus, in order to avoid such 
                                                 
138
 Id. at 453 (Thacker, J., dissenting) (quoting Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470, 
485 (1996)). 
139
 Id. at 453 (Thacker, J., dissenting). 
140
 Id. at 453 (Thacker, J., dissenting) (internal citations omitted). 
141
 Weiner, supra note 70, at 728. 
142
 Id. at 727. 
143
 Id. at 729 (citing Nixon v. Mo. Mun. League, 541 U.S. 125, 140-41 (2004) 
(explaining that the Court should read statutes “in a way that preserves a State’s chosen 
disposition of its own power, in the absence of the plain statement” historically required.)). 
144
 Id. (citing N. Y. State Conference of Blue Cross & Blue Shield Plans v. Travelers 
Ins. Co., 514 U.S. 645, 654 (“[We] have addressed claims of pre-emption with the starting 
presumption that Congress does not intend to supplant state law.” (internal citations 
omitted)). 
145
 Id. at 730 (citing Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker, 554 U.S. 471, 488-89 (2008); Dalton 
v. Little Rock Family Planning Servs., 516 U.S. 474, 476-77 (1996)). 
146
 Id. at 730. 
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charges, and for the sake of judicial economy, there is a need for uniformity 
in employing the preemption doctrine.  Specifically, consistency in applying 
the preemption language of Section 9658 of CERCLA within the federal 




In its quest to create uniformity among the federal courts’ application 
of the preemptive language of Section 9658, the Fourth Circuit considered 
two cases regarding the discovery rule in relation to state statutes of repose. 
In McDonald v. Sun,
148
 the Ninth Circuit held that the phrase “statute of 
limitations” was ambiguous.  Thus, in considering Congress’s intent in 
passing CERCLA, the Ninth Circuit ultimately held that Section 9658 was 
intended to encompass state statutes of repose as well.
149
  In Waldburger, the 
Fourth Circuit reaffirmed the Ninth Circuit’s holding, thus taking a step 
towards uniformity among federal courts in the application of Section 9658 
to include state statutes of repose.  Notably, the Fourth Circuit distinguished 
both Waldburger and McDonald from Burlington Northern and Santa Fe 
Railway Co. v. Poole Chemical Co.,
150
 a Fifth Circuit case involving a similar 
issue.  The Fourth Circuit articulated in its ruling that the plaintiffs in 
Burlington Northern and Santa Fe Railway Co. had “prior knowledge of their 
claims prior to expiration of the state statute of repose…the case [did] not 
involve the delayed discovery…which [Section] 9658 was intended to 
address.”151  Thus, the Fourth Circuit adequately distinguished Waldburger 
and McDonald from Burlington Northern and Santa Fe Railway Co., which 
in turn should guide federal courts faced with similar issues regarding the 
preemptive scope of Section 9658. 
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 For an overview of this debate, see, e.g., Barnes ex rel. Estate of Barnes v. Koppers, 
Inc., 534 F.3d 357, 362-65 (5th Cir. 2008). 
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 548 F.3d 774. 
149
 McDonald v. Sun Oil Co., 548 F.3d 774, 783 (9th Cir. 2008). 
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 419 F.3d 355. 
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 Waldburger v. CTS Corp., 723 F.3d 434, 444 (quoting Burlington Northern, 419 F.3d 
at 359-60, 364-65). 
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As noted earlier, generally there has been a presumption against 
preemption in fields traditionally regulated by the state
152
 and the burden is 
on the plaintiff to overcome this presumption.
153
  However, there has been 
the assumption that “historic police powers of the States were not to be 
superseded by the Federal Act unless that was the clear and manifest purpose 
of Congress.”154  In order to articulate this requirement of a “clear and 
manifest purpose of Congress,” the Fourth Circuit was correct in analyzing 
Congress’s intent and the legislative history of Section 9658.  By doing so, 
the Fourth Circuit acknowledged the remedial nature of CERCLA 
collectively and Section 9658’s purpose of eliminating state-imposed 
procedural obstacles for plaintiffs. Thus, the Fourth Circuit’s ruling that the 
use of “statute of limitations” in Section 9658 was intended to include state 
statutes of repose incorporates Congress’s “clear and manifest purpose,” 
which in turn leads to a preemption of any conflicting state statutes of repose.   
In response to this analysis,  that if Congress’s “clear and manifest 
purpose” were to include state statutes of repose, then such language would 
have been included in Section 9658.  However, the Fourth Circuit correctly 
established that “statute of limitations” was often used interchangeably with 
“statutes of repose” due to their common restrictive nature.  Additionally, the 
“clear and manifest purpose” of Congress should not be by the plain language 
of the law, but rather the overall intent of passing such legislation should be 
the primary focus of the court.  Preemption should not hinge on the “clear 
and manifest language” of Congress; preemption should hinge on the 
purpose of the law.  Thus, the Fourth Circuit was correct in applying 
Congress’s intent of eliminating state obstacles by passing Section 9658 in 
ruling that “statutes of limitation” included “statutes of repose.” 
 Additionally, like prior decisions construing Section 9658
155
 and 
determining Congress’s intent, the Fourth Circuit gave substantial weight to 
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 See Nat’l City Bank of Ind. v. Turnbaugh, 463 F.3d 325, 330 (4th Cir. 2006). See 
also Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470, 485 (1996). 
153
 Barnes ex rel. Estate of Barnes, 534 F.3d at 362-63 (internal citations omitted). 
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 Medtronic, 518 U.S. at 485 (citing Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 
230 (1947). 
155
 See McDonald v. Sun Oil Co., 548 F.3d 774 (9th Cir. 2008). See also Burlington N. 
& Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. Poole Chem. Co., 419 F.3d 355 (5th Cir. 2005). 
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the Group’s report in order to determine Congress’s purpose in passing the 
section.
156
  The Group’s findings of inadequacies in existing common law 
and statutory remedies providing redress for harms caused by the release of 
hazardous substances
157
 were the impetus of Congress’s prompt action in 
developing and passing Section 9658.
158
  Because the court gave significant 
consideration to the Study in interpreting the preemption language of the 
section as applying to statutes of limitation and statutes of repose, the court 
has further elevated the significance of the Group’s findings, which will 
potentially impact future courts in their analysis of Section 9658.  Although it 
is well within the individual states’ province to pass statutes of limitation 
regarding tort law claims and is derivative of the states’ historic police 
powers, such sovereignty is preempted when Congress’s purpose to do so is 
“clear and manifest.”159  Cognizant of Congress’s intent to eliminate potential 
procedural barriers pursuant to the Group’s findings, the Fourth Circuit 
appropriately gave significant weight to these combined factors in holding 
that Section 9658 preempted North Carolina’s statute of repose. 
As a result of Waldburger, potential plaintiffs with claims arising 
from alleged unlawful hazardous waste dumping will no longer have the 
obstacles imposed by state statutes of repose.
160
  Instead, state statutes of 
repose that would cause increased obstacles for private citizens seeking relief 
from unlawful dumping of hazardous substances will now be preempted by 
Section 9658.  Additionally, in reaffirming the ruling of the Ninth Circuit in 
McDonald,
161
 the Fourth Circuit has established precedent for other federal 
courts faced with similar issues.  Notably, defendants will not be susceptible 
to a wave of litigation due to the Fourth Circuit’s holding in Waldburger.  
Procedural limitations, such as North Carolina’s requirement that plaintiffs 
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 Delhotal, supra note 7, at 421-22, 424 (internal citation and emphasis omitted). 
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 Weiner, supra note 70, at 728 (citing Rice, 331 U.S. at 230 (1947)). 
160
 Statutes of repose became increasingly popular—and almost every state has them on 
the books—in response to states enacting the “discovery rule, which provides that a cause of 
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 See supra text accompanying note 85. 
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bring claims within three years of discovery,
162
 will continue to provide 
defendants some protection from untimely litigation.  Additionally, the 
burden of proof will remain on the plaintiffs, and meeting that burden may 
become increasingly difficult as time passes.
163
 Thus because such procedural 
limitations are still in place, defendants will not be vulnerable to an “opening 
of the floodgates” of litigation.  Rather, as a result of Waldburger, plaintiffs 
have one procedural barrier removed—unfair statutes of repose—but are still 
faced with a battle in meeting their burden of proof and statutes of limitation. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
The Fourth Circuit’s interpretation of Section 9658 to include statutes 
of repose, despite the seemingly plain language of the law, correctly reflects 
Congress’s intent in passing the section.  Through its ruling, the Fourth 
Circuit has alleviated a common and onerous procedural barrier for plaintiffs 
alleging harm due to illegal dumping of hazardous substances—time.  Often, 
any opportunity for redress for potential plaintiffs is fleeting because 
environmental harms frequently take time to manifest into tangible harm.  
However, the Fourth Circuit’s ruling in Waldburger allowmore time for 
potential plaintiffs bringing claims to become aware of their injury and 
develop a complaint, thus eliminating onerous time constraints that state 
statutes of repose impose.  Additionally, by holding that Section 9658 
preempted North Carolina’s statute of repose, the court established clarity for 
plaintiffs and other courts alike in determining the true potency of the 
preemptive language of the section.  In reaffirming the preemptive power of 
Section 9658, the Fourth Circuit has reinvigorated Congress’s intent in 
making CERCLA a remedial statute by insuring that victims of toxic waste 
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